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Introduction 
Computational psychiatry promises a fresh and formal approach to mental health – and Autism has 
become its ‘poster child’, generating new questions and debates (Van de Cruys et al 2013). Key 
concepts from computational neuroscience are now finding their way into discussions about the 
pathophysiology and psychopathology of autistic spectrum disorder (ASD). This is beautifully 
exemplified by Sevgi et al (2016), who report that "higher autistic traits in healthy subjects are 
related to lower scores in a learning task that requires social cue integration". Careful Bayesian 
modeling of this learning suggests that trait-related differences are not explained by a failure to 
process social stimuli per se, but rather by the extent to which participants afford precision to – or 
attend – social cues. So why is it important? For people unfamiliar with things like the Bayesian brain 
and precision, we start with a brief review of the ideas that motivated Sevgi et al (2016).  
The Bayesian brain and autism 
The story starts with a compelling heuristic (Pellicano and Burr 2012) suggesting that the problem in 
ASD is a failure to integrate sensory evidence with prior beliefs about the causes of sensations. To 
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talk about psychopathology in these terms required a theoretical framework that can accommodate 
‘beliefs’; namely, the Bayesian brain. In this setting, the brain becomes a statistical organ that 
generates hypotheses or fantasies that are tested against sensory evidence. This perspective can be 
traced back to Helmholtz and the notion of unconscious inference (Helmholtz, 1866/1962) and how 
these inferences induce beliefs and behavior.  
 
Predictive coding  
Modern versions of Helmholtz’s notion usually appeal to predictive coding. Predictive coding 
describes how the brain processes sensory information as optimizing explanations for its sensations: 
In this scheme, neuronal representations in higher levels of cortical hierarchies generate predictions 
of representations in lower levels. These top-down predictions are compared with representations 
at lower levels to form prediction errors (associated with the activity of superficial pyramidal cells). 
The ensuing mismatch is passed back up the hierarchy, to update higher representations (associated 
with the activity of deep pyramidal cells). This recursive exchange of signals suppresses prediction 
error at every level to provide a hierarchical explanation for sensory input to the lowest level. 
Computationally, neuronal activity is thought to encode beliefs about states of the world that cause 
sensations (e.g., my visual sensations are caused by a dog). The simplest encoding corresponds to 
the expected value of a cause or expectation. These causes are referred to as hidden because they 
have to be inferred from their sensory consequences. In short, predictive coding represents a 
biologically plausible scheme for updating beliefs about the world using sensory samples. See Figure 
1. 
 
How precise are predictions? 
Predictive coding provides a compelling explanation for several aspects of functional anatomy and 
perception. However, simply predicting the content of our sensations is only half the story: we also 
have to predict the confidence or precision that should be ascribed to prediction errors. This 
represents a subtle but important problem for the brain, whose solution may rest on modulating the 
gain or excitability of neuronal populations reporting prediction error (Lawson et al 2014). 
Heuristically, one can regard ascending prediction errors as broadcasting ‘newsworthy’ information 
that has yet to be explained by descending predictions. However, the brain also has to select the 
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channels it listens to by adjusting the volume of competing channels. Neurophysiologically, this 
corresponds to adjusting the gain of prediction errors that compete to update expectations. The 
boosting or precision-weighting of prediction errors is thought to be mediated by neuromodulatory 
mechanisms or synaptic gain control. This has been associated with attentional gain control in 
sensory processing and has been discussed in terms of affordance and action selection. Crucially, the 
delicate balance of precision – over hierarchical levels – has a profound effect on inference – and 
may hold the key to understanding false inference in autism (Lawson et al., 2014). 
 
Precision and autism 
So how does this help understand autism? At its simplest, the explanation rests on an imbalance 
between sensory and prior precision, where prior precision refers to the precision of prediction 
errors (and subsequent representations) at high levels of the hierarchy. This can either be construed 
as overly precise sensory information or imprecise prior beliefs, reflecting an incoherent central or 
deeply structured explanation for the sensorium. This explains the loss of central coherence and a 
pathological tendency to engage with the sensory world (Happé and Frith, 2006). But how does this 
state of affairs arise? 
More detailed developmental accounts call on a number of concepts in predictive coding, such as 
active inference, sensory attenuation and agency. Active inference explains action through 
minimizing (proprioceptive and interoceptive) prediction errors, not through adjusting 
representations, but by engaging (motor and autonomic) reflexes. In brief, reflexes enact top-down 
predictions that fulfill expectations about the active sampling of the environment. This applies to 
both motor control (through minimizing proprioceptive prediction errors) and autonomic function 
(through minimizing interoceptive prediction errors).  
Sensory attenuation refers to the attenuation of sensory precision that is necessary to suspend 
attention to sensory evidence that contradicts top-down predictions of movement. Furthermore, the 
attenuation of descending prediction errors (that elicit reflexes) enables hierarchical predictions to 
be ‘repurposed’ to infer the intentional and interoceptive states of others – without echopraxia or 
interoceptive (emotional) contagion. In other words, sensory attenuation is crucial for voluntary and 
involuntary action – and action observation. Recall that the basic problem associated with autism is 
unduly precise sensory precision (i.e., a failure of sensory attenuation). So what would this look like 
developmentally? 
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Imagine a neuromodulatory deficit (e.g., mediated by subtle changes in the synaptic effects of 
oxytocin) that precluded the attenuation of interoceptive prediction errors. Not only would this 
render autistic infants unduly sensitive to interoceptive cues (i.e., autonomic hypersensitivity) but it 
would have profound implications for a sense of agency – and the distinction between self and other 
(i.e. theory of mind). This follows from the inability to disengage autonomic reflexes during affiliative 
interactions with [m]others. In other words, the autistic infant would be unable to suspend 
autonomic reflexes during prosocial exchanges and never learn that there is a difference between 
[m]other as part of an ‘extended’ self (e.g. during breastfeeding) and [m]others as distinct from self 
(Quattrocki and Friston 2014).  
One can see how this fundamental failure to learn the causal structure of a prosocial world could 
lead to impoverished and imprecise models of interpersonal interactions – and the causes of bodily 
sensations. In this light, the findings of Sevgi et al (2016) speak to the specificity of false inference in 
ASD; namely, an inability to elaborate precise predictions in an interpersonal setting. Furthermore, 
their results speak to a failure to contextualize or attend to social cues (via a failure to predict 
sensory precision). This account raises many interesting questions about the roles of interoception in 
the development of social cognition and the relationship between alexithymia and autism. (Brewer 
et al., 2015). 
 
Aberrant precision and other theories 
The predictive coding account of autism is not the only computational game in town. Last year, a 
group of computational neuroscientists met to consider three dominant paradigms (see 
acknowledgements): In addition to aberrant precision, we considered the pruning hypothesis 
(Thomas et al., 2015) and the low-noise hypothesis (Davis and Plaisted-Grant, 2014). 
The pruning hypothesis accounts for developmental phenotypes within ASD (early-onset, late-onset, 
and regressive-recovering phenotypes). It posits that and initial exuberant formation of neuronal 
connections is followed by a period of synaptic pruning. This process has been modeled in 
supervised neural networks (that learnt the past tense of English). The basic idea is pruning is too 
aggressive in ASD, leading to behavioral deficits, followed by some recovery as the system self 
organizes. Alternatively, Davis and Plaisted-Grant (2014) compare accounts of ASD based on 
opposing assumptions about high and low levels of endogenous neuronal noise. They argue that low 
levels explain some of the psychophysical characteristics of ASD; such as enhanced perceptual 
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discrimination. Crucially, these performance enhancements come at a cost: this follows from the fact 
that a degree of imprecision (endogenous noise) is necessary to preclude perseveration.  
The exciting thing about all three theories is that they rest on precision (as a computational 
construct) and synaptic gain or efficacy (as a physiological construct). For example, in predictive 
coding, synaptic pruning depends on the precision encoded by synaptic gain – and is construed as a 
form of Bayesian model selection. Low prior precision would therefore render synaptic connections 
or associations (at higher hierarchical levels) more vulnerable to pruning. The low endogenous noise 
hypothesis is exactly congruent with a high sensory precision. This is easy to demonstrate by 
formulating gain in terms of the sensitivity of neuronal firing rates to changes in dispersion at the 
level of neuronal populations (using something called the Fokker Planck equation). This means low 
sensory noise corresponds to high sensory precision. Interestingly, fundamental statistical 
imperatives (e.g., Occam's razor) speak to the optimal attenuation of precision to ensure 
parsimonious and accurate explanations of sensory data. These point of contact illustrate the 
discourse that is enabled by a formal approach – and computationally informed studies of the sort 
offered by Sevgi et al. 
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Figure Legend 
A Predictive coding and perceptual inference: Predictive coding deals with the problem of inferring the causes 
of (generally sparse and ambiguous) sensory inputs. This is illustrated in the upper panel with a shadow that 
can be regarded as a sensory impression. A plausible explanation for this sensory input could be a howling 
canine. Predictive coding assumes that the brain has a model that generates predictions of sensory input given 
a hypothesis or expectation about how that input was caused. Here, the expectation is denoted by µ (e.g., a 
dog) and the sensory prediction generated by the model is summarized with g(µ). The prediction error is the 
difference between the input and the prediction. This prediction error is then used to update or revise the 
expectation, until prediction error is minimized. At this point, the expectation provides the best explanation or 
inference for the causes of sensations. Note that this inference does not have to be veridical. In the lower 
panel, the actual cause of sensations was a cat; however, the beholder may never know the true causes – 
provided that we minimize our prediction errors consistently, our model of the world will be sufficient to infer 
plausible causes in the outside world that are hidden behind a veil of sensations. B Oxytocin and the failure of 
sensory attenuation. This schematic describes (simplified) neural architectures underlying the predictive 
coding of simple, somatosensory and autonomic signals. The anatomical designations should not be taken too 
seriously – they are just used to illustrate how predictive coding can be mapped onto neuronal systems. Red 
triangles correspond to neuronal populations (superficial pyramidal cells) encoding prediction error, while blue 
triangles represent populations (deep pyramidal cells) encoding expectations. These populations provide 
descending predictions to prediction error populations in lower hierarchical levels (blue connections). The 
prediction error populations then reciprocate ascending prediction errors to adjust the expectations (red 
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connections and). Arrows denote excitatory connections, while circles denote inhibitory effects (mediated by 
inhibitory interneurons). These recurrent connections mediate innate (epigenetically specified) reflexes – such 
as the suckling reflex – that elicit autonomic (e.g., vasovagal) reflexes in response to appropriate 
somatosensory input. These reflexes depend upon high-level representations predicting both the 
somatosensory input and interoceptive consequences. The representations are activated by somatosensory 
prediction errors and send interoceptive predictions to the hypothalamic area – to elicit interoceptive 
prediction errors that are resolved in the periphery by autonomic reflexes. Oxytocin (in green) is shown to 
project to the hypothalamic area, to modulate the gain or precision of prediction error units. One hypothesis 
for autism rests on a failure to attenuate the precision of autonomic prediction errors; thereby precluding 
inference about somatosensory and visual information (e.g., a mother’s face or affiliative touch) that does not 
elicit autonomic reflexes. 
